Proofs of Ignorance and Applications to 2-Message Witness Hiding

We consider the following paradoxical question: Can one prove lack of knowledge? We define the notion of \u27Proofs of Ignorance\u27, construct such proofs, and use these proofs to construct a 2-message witness hiding protocol for all of NP. More specifically, we define a proof of ignorance (PoI) with respect to any language L in NP and distribution D over instances in L. Loosely speaking, such a proof system allows a prover to generate an instance x according to D along with a proof that she does not know a witness corresponding to x. We construct construct a PoI protocol for any random self-reducible NP language L that is hard on average. Our PoI protocol is non-interactive assuming the existence of a common reference string. We use such a PoI protocol to construct a 2-message witness hiding protocol for NP with adaptive soundness. Constructing a 2-message WH protocol for all of NP has been a long standing open problem. We construct our witness hiding protocol using the following ingredients (where T is any super-polynomial function in the security parameter): 1. T-secure PoI protocol, 2. T-secure non-interactive witness indistinguishable (NIWI) proofs, 3. T-secure rerandomizable encryption with strong KDM security with bounded auxiliary input, where the first two ingredients can be constructed based on the $T$-security of DLIN. At the heart of our witness-hiding proof is a new non-black-box technique. As opposed to previous works, we do not apply an efficiently computable function to the code of the cheating verifier, rather we resort to a form of case analysis and show that the prover\u27s message can be simulated in both cases, without knowing in which case we reside

Cryptography from Information Loss

© Marshall Ball, Elette Boyle, Akshay Degwekar, Apoorvaa Deshpande, Alon Rosen, Vinod. Reductions between problems, the mainstay of theoretical computer science, efficiently map an instance of one problem to an instance of another in such a way that solving the latter allows solving the former.1 The subject of this work is “lossy” reductions, where the reduction loses some information about the input instance. We show that such reductions, when they exist, have interesting and powerful consequences for lifting hardness into “useful” hardness, namely cryptography. Our first, conceptual, contribution is a definition of lossy reductions in the language of mutual information. Roughly speaking, our definition says that a reduction C is t-lossy if, for any distribution X over its inputs, the mutual information I(X; C(X)) ≤ t. Our treatment generalizes a variety of seemingly related but distinct notions such as worst-case to average-case reductions, randomized encodings (Ishai and Kushilevitz, FOCS 2000), homomorphic computations (Gentry, STOC 2009), and instance compression (Harnik and Naor, FOCS 2006). We then proceed to show several consequences of lossy reductions: 1. We say that a language L has an f-reduction to a language L0 for a Boolean function f if there is a (randomized) polynomial-time algorithm C that takes an m-tuple of strings X = (x1, . . ., xm), with each xi ∈ {0, 1}n, and outputs a string z such that with high probability, L0(z) = f(L(x1), L(x2), . . ., L(xm)) Suppose a language L has an f-reduction C to L0 that is t-lossy. Our first result is that one-way functions exist if L is worst-case hard and one of the following conditions holds: f is the OR function, t ≤ m/100, and L0 is the same as L f is the Majority function, and t ≤ m/100 f is the OR function, t ≤ O(m log n), and the reduction has no error This improves on the implications that follow from combining (Drucker, FOCS 2012) with (Ostrovsky and Wigderson, ISTCS 1993) that result in auxiliary-input one-way functions. 2. Our second result is about the stronger notion of t-compressing f-reductions – reductions that only output t bits. We show that if there is an average-case hard language L that has a t-compressing Majority reduction to some language for t = m/100, then there exist collision-resistant hash functions. This improves on the result of (Harnik and Naor, STOC 2006), whose starting point is a cryptographic primitive (namely, one-way functions) rather than average-case hardness, and whose assumption is a compressing OR-reduction of SAT (which is now known to be false unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses). Along the way, we define a non-standard one-sided notion of average-case hardness, which is the notion of hardness used in the second result above, that may be of independent interest

SEEMless: Secure End-to-End Encrypted Messaging with less trust

End-to-end encrypted messaging (E2E) is only secure if participants have a way to retrieve the correct public key for the desired recipient. However, to make these systems usable, users must be able to replace their keys (e.g. when they lose or reset their devices, or reinstall their app), and we cannot assume any cryptographic means of authenticating the new keys. In the current E2E systems, the service provider manages the directory of public keys of its registered users; this allows a compromised or coerced service provider to introduce their own keys and execute a man in the middle attack. Building on the approach of CONIKS (Melara et al, USENIX Security `15), we formalize the notion of a Privacy-Preserving Verifiable Key Directory (VKD): a system which allows users to monitor the keys that the service is distributing on their behalf. We then propose a new VKD scheme which we call SEEMless, which improves on prior work in terms of privacy and scalability. In particular, our new approach allows key changes to take effect almost immediately; we show experimentally that our scheme easily supports delays less than a minute, in contrast to previous work which proposes a delay of one hour

Fully Homomorphic NIZK and NIWI Proofs

In this work, we define and construct fully homomorphic non-interactive zero knowledge (FH-NIZK) and non-interactive witness-indistinguishable (FH-NIWI) proof systems. We focus on the NP complete language $L$, where, for a boolean circuit $C$ and a bit $b$, the pair $(C,b) \in L$ if there exists an input $w$ such that $C(w)=b$. For this language, we call a non-interactive proof system \u27fully homomorphic\u27 if, given instances $(C_i,b_i) \in L$ along with their proofs $\Pi_i$, for $i \in \{1,\ldots,k\}$, and given any circuit $D:\{0,1\}^k \rightarrow \{0,1\}$, one can efficiently compute a proof $\Pi$ for $(C^*,b) \in L$, where $C^*(w^{(1)}, \ldots,w^{(k)})=D(C_1(w^{(1)}),\ldots,C_k(w^{(k)}))$ and $D(b_1,\ldots,b_k)=b$. The key security property is \u27unlinkability\u27: the resulting proof $\Pi$ is indistinguishable from a fresh proof of the same statement. Our first result, under the Decision Linear Assumption (DLIN), is an FH-NIZK proof system for L in the common random string model. Our more surprising second result (under a new decisional assumption on groups with bilinear maps) is an FH-NIWI proof system that requires no setup